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LEGITIMATING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PLURALIST
APPROACHES
Ruth Buchanan, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada
Introduction
This article will take up the conversation about legal pluralism in the context
of debates over transnational governance, where legal pluralism has of late
attracted considerable attention.1 Legal pluralism has its roots in legal
sociology and anthropology, and particularly in the study of the co-existence
of non-state, customary law or community norms with formal law.2 In the
transnational context, this original focus is expanded to include the coexistence, within a particular territory, of multiple normative regimes; local,
national and international. What is important to note, however, is that in this
shift the conceptual orientation of the term remains the same: the effort to
provide an empirically accurate description of multiple positive legal orders.
That is, legal pluralism is conventionally utilized to identify a relevant
attribute of the social fields in which law operates.3 So, most recent
considerations of ‘global legal pluralism’ either invoke or illustrate the
multiple, diverse and possibly even contested sources of law in transnational
arenas, and argue for their growing sociological significance. As I will
elaborate below, while legal multiplicity is highlighted and even valorized in
some of these accounts, their analytic reach is circumscribed by a positive
conception of law itself.
While it is difficult to disagree with the chorus claiming that transnational
institutions must recognize pluralism as a relevant attribute of the global
social fields that they seek to govern, it is also the case that this apparently
modest descriptive claim embeds a number of assumptions about both law
and the social that have for some time been subjected to considerable
scrutiny within socio-legal scholarship.4 At the very least, it appears to posit
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See generally Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking
the Trade and Environment Conflict (2004); Teubner, “Global Bukowina: Legal
Pluralism in World Society”, p.3, in Teubner, (ed), Global Law Without a State
(1997); Wolfe, “See You in Geneva? Pluralism and Centralism in Legal
Representations of the Trading System” (2005) 11 Eur.J.Int’l Rel. 339; Macklem,
“Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism and the Paradox of Self-Determination”, 4
I.J.C.L.488 (2006).
Melissaris, “The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism” (2004) Soc.
& L.S. 57 at 58. For influential summaries of the field, see also Griffiths, “What is
Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 J. Legal Plur. 1 and Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’
(1988) 22 L. & Soc. R. 869.
Griffiths, supra n.2, at 2.
As the relationship between ‘law’ and ‘society’ is the core concern of this field, the
sources that could be cited are manifold. Some ‘classic’ considerations might
include Trubek and Esser, “‘Critical Empiricism’ in American Legal Studies:
Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box?” (1989) 14 L.&.Soc. Inquiry 3; as well as the
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as self-evident a distinction between the legal and the social fields, each
understood as autonomous, coherent and therefore available for objective
description. In some further accounts, which I will discuss in more detail, a
normative claim is added to the empirical one, in which the ‘problem’ of
legal multiplicity is resolved by reference to some higher regulative
principle, such as a constitution.
In this article, however, I seek to invest legal pluralism with quite a different
analytic status.5 My approach has affinities with those who have identified
legal pluralism as an aesthetic choice, an ethos, or a form of critical theory.6
My point is neither to map a complex global legal environment nor to offer a
theory of law per se. Rather, and very much like several of the other papers
in this symposium issue, I am attempting to open up a space in which to
engage in a dialogue about different possible ways of imagining law.
My own approach to the question of legal pluralism is historical, practical
and critical.7 It takes as its starting point a critique of the tendency in
contemporary debates on global governance to think of law as a privileged
vehicle for carrying us towards some shared horizon of aspiration, that is,
some more perfectly democratic or inclusive or responsive legal order to
come. That imagined future is rendered unattainable, I will argue, by the
very conception of law in which it is conceived, a conception that also
functions to limit our perceptions of legality in the present. An alternative
might be found in the re-traversal of the terrain of legal theory from the
perspective of an ethos or ethic of pluralism. Such an undertaking might
invite a re-framing, at least provisionally, of such fundamental questions as
the boundaries and form of law. It becomes, if only for a moment, possible
to imagine legal forms and institutions as both contingent and continually
revisable. Through such a re-framing, I seek to open up new avenues for reconceiving dominant forms of global governance and new opportunities for
those whose interests are inadequately addressed by current institutions.8
The article situates its practical critique specifically in relation to the World
Trade Organization, and in particular, the range of responses to the widely
articulated concern over that institution’s ‘crisis of legitimacy’. Concerns
about legitimacy are frequently connected closely to the question of
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essays collected in Sarat, Austin, Constable, Engel, Hans and Lawrence (eds.),
Crossing Boundaries: Traditions and Transformations in Law and Society
Research (1998).
This formulation was prompted by Professor Davina Cooper’s probing
commentary on an earlier version of this paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Law and Society Association, Las Vegas, Nevada, June 2005.
See Manderson, “Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal
Theory” 20 (1995) MULR 1048; Davies, “The Ethos of Pluralism” (2005) 27 Syd
LR 87; Kleinhans and MacDonald, “What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12
Can.J.L. & Soc’y 25
My orientation draws heavily on Tully’s account of critical philosophy in “Political
Philosophy as a Critical Activity” (2002) 30 Pol. Theory 533.
As Tully, supra n.7, at 534, cogently describes it, the activity of critique “seeks to
characterize the conditions of possibility of the problematic form of governance in
a redescription (often in a new vocabulary) that transforms the self-understanding
of those subject to and struggling within it, enabling them to see its contingent
conditions and the possibilities of governing themselves differently”
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pluralism. In the WTO context, perceived deficits of democracy and
accountability are seen to undermine its claim to legitimate authority.9 The
domination of internal WTO agenda setting and negotiation processes by a
few developed nations, and its relative impermeability to civil society
organizations have been widely critiqued on the grounds that they reveal
deep inadequacies of pluralism and democracy within the institution.10
Although the debate over how to address these inadequacies has been rich
and multifaceted, the range of approaches can be summarized in terms of two
contrasting ideal-types. The first is characterized by a formal, positive and
singular conception of law, and might be described as the ‘constitutional’
approach. Constitutional approaches in relation to the WTO tend to advocate
an expansive and hierarchical approach to institutional reform that would
aim to incorporate actors and interests who claim to have been previously
excluded, as well as to consolidate the WTO’s legitimate authority over a
broad swathe of contemporary transnational governance issues. A ‘pluralist’
or ‘cosmopolitan’ approach, in contrast, would include an attentiveness to
norm creation at the informal level and a much more modest conception of
the appropriate policy scope of the institution. It would posit the WTO as one
norm creating body among many in the international community, and
encourage an interactional process of norm-creation among variously
situated international actors.11
This article will examine only one dimension of these broadly contrasting
approaches, the legal-theoretical. On the premise that one’s legal theory
matters, that is, it has (material) consequences both for the design of
institutions and for the conduct of actors within them, I seek both to
investigate the concepts of law that are embedded within these debates, and
to consider their effects. Further, the debate over the constitutionalization of
the WTO is not considered in isolation, but as one animated by and
illustrative of a more general concern: how to legitimate the exercise of
public authority beyond the state.12 This article takes the issue of the
legitimacy of the institutions of international governance as its point of
departure.13 However, legitimacy is here understood as ‘problematique’: that
is, a form of problematization that emanates from a historically contingent
set of conceptions and practices relating to international institutions, law, and
democracy.14
______________________________________________________________
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Krajewski, “Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law”
(2001) 35 J.W.T. 167.
10
Jawara and Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International
Trade Negotiations (2003)
11
Brunnee and Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an
Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39 Colum. J.Transnat’l L. 19.
12
Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade
Organization (2001), p.4. See also Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy - And
Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime” (2002) 96 AJIL at 94.
13
Coicaud and Heiskanen, The Legitimacy of International Organizations (2001);
Delbruck, “Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational
Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?” (2003) 10 Ind. J.Global
Legal Studies 29.
14
Tully, supra n.2, at 551, in attempting a definition of “political theory” defines a
“subaltern school” of political theory that does not seek a normative solution but
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The ‘Legitimacy Crisis’ and Legal Formalism
The apparent intractability of the debates over the legitimacy of an
international institution such as the WTO, my argument will suggest, is in
large measure a reflection of the legal framework in which they are typically
cast. A legitimacy critique already identifies the problem as a matter of
institutional design. By calling into question the architecture of the institution
itself, as opposed to its failure to achieve any particular desired outcomes,
the critique invokes formalist debates over what H.L.A. Hart has called
‘secondary’ rules.15 In Hart’s hierarchical conception, secondary rules, the
‘rules of the rules’ or the rules that determine which rules are indeed ‘law’,
are a necessary part of a mature and functioning legal system.16 Indeed,
Hart’s question, considered in the final chapter of The Concept of Law, “Is
international law really law?”17 is one that continues to vex international
lawyers.18 Despite the obvious difficulties in adapting a positivist view of
law to the contemporary international legal arena, it continues to exert a
significant ‘pull’.19 Legitimacy critics (and defenders) routinely invoke a
relatively narrow range of familiar legal theoretical presumptions, based on a
questionable analogy with domestic legal realms, about the proper
foundations of legal authority, and by implication, the necessary forms of
legitimate legality, in the international realm.
The vast majority of participants in these debates, whether they might be
broadly characterized as ‘defenders’ or ‘critics’ of the current institutional
order, share certain foundational assumptions about the nature of the
international community and the form of international law, even as they
disagree over the specific legal and institutional arrangements that might best
achieve the imagined ends. This ‘shared sensibility’ has been described as
______________________________________________________________

15

16
17

18

19

grounds itself in practical concerns. This type of political theory utilizes historical
surveys in order to be able to see “practices and their forms of problematization as
a limited and contingent whole”, at 534. “If we are to develop a political
philosophy that has the capacity to bring to light the specific forms of oppression
today, we require an Enlightenment critical ‘attitude’ rather than a doctrine, one
that can test and reform dubious aspects of the dominant practices and form of
problematization of politics against a better approach to what is going on in
practice”, at 537.
See, e.g. Trachtman, in adopting HLA Hart’s formalist hierarchy of primary and
secondary rules to questions of constitutionalism at the WTO, proposes that a
special type of secondary rule, a ‘tertiary rule,’ is necessary to determine the
allocation of authority between constitutions in the international realm.
Trachtman, “The WTO Constitution: Tertiary Rules to Untangle Intertwined
Elephants” (2004) unpublished (on file with author), p.4.
Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1961).
ibid. at p.209. “It is indeed arguable, as we shall show, that international law not
only lacks secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for
legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’
of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules. These
differences are indeed striking and the question, ‘Is international law really law?’
can hardly be put aside.”
Pahuja, “Power and the Rule of Law in the Global Context” (2004) 28(1) MURL
232; see also, Kennedy, “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box”
(2000) 32(2) N.Y.U.J.Int’l Law & Pol. 335.
Brunnee and Toope, supra n.12, at 22-24.
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‘cosmopolitan’ or even ‘messianic’.20 It locates the antagonists of debates
over international governance within a shared horizon of aspiration: a
‘better’, more inclusive and democratic world order which functions as an
ever-present, yet continually deferred backdrop, to the discourses of global
governance. As Anne Orford has described, in relation to the ‘linkage’
debate over trade and human rights, “proponents and opponents of the WTO
both use an appeal to ‘democracy to come’ as the foundation of the
arguments about the need to reform existing laws and institutions”.21
My aim in this article is to consider in more detail what embedded
assumptions about the necessary or possible forms of law are mobilized
within these debates, and what role they might play in shaping the future of
international governance. It is my argument that how we imagine the ‘form’
of law makes a significant difference both to our conceptualization of
problem and the available range of possible solutions. Much work in this
field envisions pluralism as an important vehicle by which to improve the
legitimacy, democracy and accountability of the WTO and other institutions
of transnational governance. Integrating non-governmental actors and
‘disaggregating’ conceptions of sovereignty or the state are typical
pluralizing gestures found within this literature.22 Yet, at the same time,
these debates have tended to re-inscribe presumptions of about the positive
and unified (monist) nature of law conveyed through their reliance on the
language of coherence, linkages or constitutionalism.

Pluralizing the WTO from Within: The Mystical Appeal of
Co nstitutionalism
Why is it that, in our heterogeneous and constantly changing global context,
a ‘constitutional’ conception of law seems so compelling? In most accounts,
the quest for a ‘post-national’ constitutionalism is described as emerging in
response to perceived ‘deficits’ of governance at the transnational level: of
democracy, legitimacy, accountability. It is also a response that seeks to
draw from the deep well of signification that constitutional discourse carries
in the west. As Neil Walker observes, “the normatively continuous idea of
constitutionalism is linked in a powerful and resilient chain of signification
to a whole series of core governance values– democracy, accountability,
equality, separation of powers, rule of law and fundamental rights”.23
The appeal of constitutionalism as an explanatory framework for current and
anticipated developments in the international trading regime is multifaceted.
Firstly, constitutional theory conventionally provides an account of the
political foundations of legitimate legal authority, which as we’ve seen, has
been called into question in the WTO context. Secondly, the ‘hands-tying’
______________________________________________________________
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Buchanan, “Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legality at the WTO:
Perpetual Peace or Perpetual Process?” (2003) 16 LJIL 673: on the messianic, see
Orford, “Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice” (2004) Jean
Monnet Working Paper, and Koskenniemi “Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom
Franck’s Messianic World” (2003) 35 N.Y.U.J.Int’l Law & Pol. 471 at 486.
Orford, ibid., at 4.
Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65(3) M.L.R 317;
Slaughter, A New World Order (2004).
Walker, supra n.22 at 344.
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quality of constitutionalism appeals to advocates of a liberalized global
trading order, such as Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, who sees its benefits
threatened by the potential capture of the domestic political process in
member-states by various special interests.24 Constitutional debates also
hold out the promise of ‘recognition’ and ‘accommodation’ of diverse
constituencies and normative claims within a single unifying framework.
Hence, they resonate with those who are concerned with linkage issues, often
identified as the range of ‘trade and . . .’ concerns: environment, human
rights, labour, or sustainable development. Indeed, one might suggest that the
turn to constitutional discourse at the WTO seems to offer all things to all
people: it first grounds WTO law in political legitimacy, then sets it above
the fray of politics, all the while promising a dispassionate arena for the fair
resolution of fundamental normative disagreements.
What binds these very disparate approaches and perspectives together is a set
of ideas about ‘constitutionalism’ that are, in turn, dependent upon a
particular view of law. So it is that we find some commentators drawing our
attention to points of convergence between WTO legal structures or practices
and domestic legal forms, such as the juridification of the dispute resolution
process by the introduction of the Appellate Body and the types of reasoning
it has deployed.25 Others base their arguments on the points of divergence;
maintaining that the WTO as currently constituted must fail the test of
constitutional adequacy because of its deficits in the realm of democratic
representation, ‘voice’ or citizenship.26 In both cases, however, the implicit
standard is municipal or state constitutionalism. In this way, constitutional
debates about the WTO have the effect of making our discussions of the
global trading order look more like the formal and autonomous picture of
‘state law’ that implicitly functions as the standard of legality against which
all other forms of normative ordering are judged.27 They also have the effect
of setting the WTO further apart from (and possibly above) other institutions
(and mechanisms) through which transnational economic relations are
governed, in line with the implicit assumption that ‘legal orders’ must be
hierarchical. Debates about economic governance framed in constitutional
terms resonate with a wide range of differently positioned actors in part
______________________________________________________________
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Petersmann, “Constitutional Primacy and ‘Indivisibility’ of Human Rights in
International Law? The Unfinished Human Rights Revolution and the Emerging
Global Integration Law”, p.211, in Griller (ed.) International Economic
Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the International
Legal Order (2002).
Cass, “Constitutionalization of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm Generation
as the Engine of Constitutional Development of International Trade” (2001) 12(1)
EJIL 39.
Krajewski, supra n.9; Howse and Nicolaidis, “Enhancing WTO Legitimacy:
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?”, p.73, in Verwej and Josling (eds.),
“Deliberately Democratizing Multilateral Organizations”: (2003) 16(1)
Governance.
“Much of the effort in recent inter-state trade, environmental and human rights
negotiation has been directed to reducing the distance between these transnational
and national normative constructs by recasting the former in the image of the
latter”: MacDonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal
Pluralism” (1998) 15 Ariz.J.Int'l & Comp.L. 69 at 80.
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because they tend to transpose familiar arguments from the domestic realm
onto the terrain of international economic law.
Further, constitutional discourses are frequently identified as a framework
within which competing normative claims are balanced and accommodated.
That is, constitutionalism is one vehicle within which the challenges
presented by political pluralism for governance are to be managed, at both
the national and transnational level.28 Within the WTO, constitutionalism is
often presented as offering both a principled way to integrate the
acknowledged variety of ‘trade and . . .’ concerns that have accompanied the
expanding agendas of recent negotiating rounds and a foundation for
engagement with non-state or civil society actors. As has frequently been
observed, fostering political pluralism requires the development of
mechanisms of democratic accountability, as well as the capacity to facilitate
political trade-offs between areas of jurisdictional authority.29 Each of these
presumes a ‘totality’ in relation to which the balancing or accounting is done.
In its current form, the WTO is usually recognized as lacking both the
jurisdictional scope and autonomy and the law-making authority to facilitate
such balancing.30 Advocates of WTO constitutionalism seek to redress this
lack by expanding both the scope and the authority of the WTO, while
scholars located within what I’ve described as the pluralist approach would
prefer that these normative conflicts be resolved outside the institution.
Most fundamentally, I would argue, the attraction of constitutionalism is the
view that, in purporting to ground legal authority in a founding act of
political will, constitutional approaches offer a type of ‘practical’ solution to
the “thorny issues of the non-foundational foundations of law.”31 A
constitution is essentially an originary narrative, in that it offers an account
of the source of both legal and political authority.32 It does so by purporting
to ground that authority in the political will of a ‘people’ understood to be
capable of acting as a unified entity. The ‘people,’ however, cannot come
into existence as such until after the founding inaugurated by the
constitution. The constitutional ‘moment’, then, is always a type of ‘pious
fiction’.33
Critical scholars have for some time scrutinized this paradox of law’s
purported ‘founding’ in a constitutional moment – as Peter Fitzpatrick has
perhaps put it most succinctly, that “the origin has to ‘be’ before and after the
______________________________________________________________
28
29

30

31

32
33

Walker, supra n.22.
Nanz and Steffek, “Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere”
(2004) Governance and Opposition 314. See also, Howse and Nicolaides, supra
n.27
“WTO law allows for the constraint of policies that interfere with the trading
rights of members, but there no institutional arrangements provide for the creation
of new, agreed-upon policies that can rebalance such trading rights with other
legitimate policy objectives”; Howse and Nicolaidis, supra n.27 at 84
Teubner, “Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered
Constitutional Theory?”, p.3 et seq., in Joerges, Sand and Teubner (eds.)
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (2004).
Pahuja and Beard,(eds.), Divining the Source: Law’s Foundation and the Question
of Authority (2004).
Hart, supra n.17 at 153.
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point of origination”.34 Debates over transnational constitutionalization that
begin from the assumption that law’s autonomy and authority are definitively
secured ‘within’ the state, and that this foundational authority needs to be
somehow replicated in the transnational sphere, miss this point about law’s
paradoxically divided origins. The insight that law is not unified, even at its
point of origination, instead leads us back towards the ethos of plurality to
which I will shortly turn.
Some scholars have identified ‘the process of mutual constitution and
containment’ of law and politics as a necessary, indeed defining, feature of
constitutionalism.35 As Gunther Teubner puts it, “The point is continually to
understand the paradoxical process in which any creating of law always
already presupposes the rudimentary elements of its own constitution, and, at
the same time, constitutes these only through their implementation”.36 This
paradoxical relation is what holds law and politics, necessarily, both together
and apart, enabling and constraining each.37 But the pragmatic embrace of
the paradoxical nature of law’s foundations, an insight already central to
much contemporary legal theorizing, doesn’t yet answer the question that
frames this section – what is the specific attraction of constitutionalism for
these scholars?
The normative thrust of this argument finds its source in the ‘reflexive’
nature of constitutional discourse itself. Reframing public and scholarly
debates in constitutional terms, for these scholars, contains the potential to
transform the ongoing process of transnational juridification in such a way as
to bring into being the conditions for legitimate constitutionalization that are
currently lacking. As Walker puts it, “…in the final analysis the ideological
dimension of constitutional politics…is not the enemy of a normative
discourse of responsible self government but rather its necessary
accompaniment, and indeed, a central part of its generative context.”38 For
Teubner, it is to ‘guarantee the chances of articulating so-called non-rational
logics of action against the dominant social rationalization trend, by
conquering areas of autonomy for social reflection in long-lasting conflicts,
and institutionalizing them”.39 Both Walker and Teubner, albeit from within
quite different theoretical models, appear to be basing their argument for
constitutionalism on a belief in the salutary effects of constitutional discourse
itself. In the end, this approach rests on the hope that constitutionalism will
“(open) up a richer and more productive normative debate”.40 Even
constitutional sceptics such as Howse and Nicolaidis acknowledge that this
______________________________________________________________
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Fitzpatrick, “Breaking the unity of the world: Savage Sources and feminine law”
(2003) 19 Aus Fem LJ 47
Walker, supra n.19 at 340.
Teubner, supra n.31 at 16.
Teubner, supra n.31 at 20; in the language of systems theory, “long term structural
linkages of sub-system specific structures and legal norms are set up . . . The
important effect of structural linkage is that it restrains both—the legal process and
the social process – in their possibilities of influence.”.
Walker, “The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key”, p.58, in de
Burca and Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues”
(2001).
Teubner, supra n.31 at 13.
ibid., at 54.
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self-reflexive tendency of constitutional discourse may, over the longer term,
contain some limited potential to contribute to a transformation of the
currently inhospitable conditions for a pluralist politics at the WTO, even as
they are highly critical of most efforts to ‘bootstrap’ the legitimacy of the
WTO by relying on constitutional discourse itself as the vehicle to bring
about the very conditions needed for its emergence.41
Ultimately, this argument brings us back to the question to what extent do
even reflexive constitutional approaches pre-determine the parameters within
which transnational legality must take shape? Two tendencies are of concern
here. Firstly, there is the way in which a call for constitutionalism is
responsive to the discourse of ‘deficits’ mentioned earlier. That is,
constitutional discourse is posited as a supplement, something that will
supply ‘more’ of whatever is currently ‘lacking’ in transnational legality;
democracy, accountability, legitimacy, or even, self-reflexive constitutional
discourse itself. Similarly, the call for constitutionalism implies both a
hierarchy and a trajectory of transnational legalities, in which some emerging
legal forms are imagined as more complete (constitution-like) than others.
This trajectory, which might be said to parallel to the developmental
hierarchy of states in the Westphalian order, has the effect of privileging
certain legal forms, such as judicial norm-generation, over others.42 Further,
constitutional debate tends to focus on highly formalized and juridified
entities such as the EU and the WTO, while an entity such as the World
Social Forum, devoted to broadening and democratizing the public debate
over transnational norms, is virtually ignored. In these ways, we can see that
the potential of constitutional discourse to facilitate the pluralizing and/or
democratizing of the practices of transnational governance is actually quite
limited. Paradoxically, despite the prominence given to the need for pluralist
institutional reform within contemporary debates over the legitimacy of the
WTO, closer consideration of this scholarship also reveals an enduring
rigidity: the persistence of the modernist preference for coherence and order
in the imagining of legal forms.43

Pluralizing the WTO from Without: Civil Society
Engagem ents
In recent years, there has been a dramatic expansion of transnational
advocacy on the part of nongovernmental organizations focused on
international institutions such as the WTO.44 These transnational advocacy
efforts and the networks that they engender are frequently described as a
‘global civil society’ whose emergence is then identified with a number of
positive outcomes for global governance.45 Organized civil society is often
identified as providing a “discursive interface between international
______________________________________________________________
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Howse and Nicolaidis, supra n.27 at 91.
Cass, supra n.26.
See Manderson, supra n.7, for a discussion of this modernist inclination towards
coherence and order as an aesthetic preference.
I have argued elsewhere that the picture of the nation-state in decline has been
frequently overdrawn. Buchanan and Pahuja, “Law, Nation, and (Imagined)
International Communities” (2004) 8 Law, Text, Culture 137.
See generally the various editions of the OUP Global Civil Society Yearbook,
inaugurated in 2001.

10

Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 57, No. 4]

organizations and a global citizenry” capable of “monitor(ing) policy making
in these institutions, …bring(ing) citizens concerns into their deliberations
and empower(ing) marginalized groups so that they too may participate
effectively in global politics”.46 The discourse of global civil society is
sustained by a cosmopolitan sensibility, which underpins a vision of an
imagined ‘global community’ that is simultaneously inclusive, plural and
governable.47
Not surprisingly, the on-the-ground struggles of transnational advocacy
networks are far removed from the utopian aspirations frequently projected
upon them. All too frequently, the role of transnational NGO’s in global
governance is functional, technocratic and apolitical. The meetings and
cooperative understandings of governance networks are usually private,
informal, and lacking in mechanisms for accountability or transparency.
Rather than facilitating political processes, transnational NGO’s have been
criticized as effectively helping to bureaucratize and de-politicize the
activities of governments across borders.48 Rather than an imagined ‘voice
of the people’ idealized as distinct from the dictates of both governments and
the market, transnational networks of NGO’s have emerged in tandem with
the shift to different styles of governing both at domestic and international
levels. Moreover, the goals and interests of actors in governance networks
cannot be imagined as ‘autonomous’ or ‘objective’, but are constructed
through their myriad interactions embedded within these networks over
time.49 In these ways, it is possible to argue that the space for politics in
global governance networks has been diminished, even as the participation of
NGO’s has expanded.50
The constraints on the capacity of NGO networks to engender pluralism in
the practices of international institutions can be illustrated by recent
developments in WTO/civil society relations.51 Over the past six years,
various coalitions of civil society organizations have pressed for greater
access to both rule-making and dispute resolution processes within the
institution.52 Many NGO’s and commentators would likely describe these
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efforts as having only very limited success, however, resulting in a few
largely cosmetic institutional reforms.53 That said, a focus on formal
institutional resistance by the WTO to NGO demands for greater access and
transparency may overlook some important but less visible shifts. A number
of transnational nongovernmental organizations, at least since the Doha
Ministerial Round in 2001, have increasingly targeted their advocacy efforts
‘behind the scenes’ on particular issues that will enable them to build
relationships with delegates from various member-state governments.
Several of these organizations have recently opened offices in Geneva to
more effectively track the institution’s activities and lobby member-state
representatives.54 Because they are in Geneva, building close relationships
with delegates and members of the Secretariat, these groups are able to gain
informal access, to disseminate to other NGO’s, and even member country
governments, a great deal of information that is not officially public. Some
organizations have built very comprehensive websites that serve as clearing
houses for reports of various negotiation developments, and detailed
accounts are usually posted within days of these ‘closed door’ sessions
occurring.55 In general, a great deal of information about what is going on
inside this allegedly closed and secretive institution is now widely available
almost immediately, due to the work of a number of transnational legal
advocacy and civil society groups.56
So, while many NGO’s may profess frustration at the lack of progress on the
institutional reform agenda, they would also acknowledge that the
environment within which trade policy is both made and adjudicated by the
WTO has changed significantly in the past decade. Significantly,
transnational advocacy organizations have worked with developing country
governments to bolster their capacities to participate effectively in trade
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negotiations and in trade disputes.57 Some have even provided assistance in
the preparation of legal arguments for trade disputes to small country
governments. Many seek to provide in depth information and research on
issues of concern to particular member states, such as the campaign by
Oxfam leading up to the Cancun Ministerial Round to publicize the impact
of cotton subsidies on the West African nations of Burkina Faso, Benin,
Chad, and Mali.58 Such efforts on the part of NGO’s in support of member
country governments can raise the profile of issues, getting new topics on the
agenda (as in the case of cotton subsidies) or even result in changes to
negotiated text (as in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health).59
During the 2003 Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, NGO’s convened at least a
dozen parallel conferences and workshops on various trade policy issues,
many of which attracted both ‘official’ members of delegations as well as
academics and activists. Finally, in the realm of dispute resolution, the
ongoing controversy over the consideration of amicus briefs has not
prevented a number of organizations from continuing to prepare and file such
briefs.60 Even though they may not be formally cited or ‘considered’ by the
Appellate Body there are good reasons to believe that they are indeed read,
and that over time the submission of persuasive and well argued briefs from
third parties may well function to ‘broaden the perspectives’ of judges.61
In the interstices of the relatively formalized procedures for dispute
resolution, and in conference rooms and hotel lobbies in Geneva, Doha,
Cancun and Hong Kong, ongoing debates over the appropriate scope and
substance of trade policy are taking place. To the extent that a number of
civil society organizations have invested their resources in developing the
capacity to speak the language of trade policy and in closely monitoring
current developments in Geneva, they have indeed become participants in the
collective process of norm-generation in and around the WTO. Yet, even as
trade governance has become pluralized in recent years, these developments
don’t appear to be leading to the type of institutional transformation that
many have suggested is so urgently needed. This is because expanded
participation in governance networks is a significant, but not the most
significant, mechanism of pluralization. There must also be the opportunity
for a plurality of institutional and legal forms to develop and evolve. While
one form of plurality may lead to the other, it doesn’t necessarily follow that
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a more diverse set of participants will produce more diverse institutional
arrangements.
One of the key claims made in this article is that the modest degree of
success arguably achieved by recent NGO efforts to engage with the World
Trade Organization and to influence both its institutional structure and its
decision making processes fails to include a re-conception of legal forms and
institutions, and for that reason, falls short of the degree of transformation
that it seeks. I have argued that debates over the reform of the institution,
while they rarely consider law in an explicit or conceptual manner, are
frequently infused with an implicit notion of law as an autonomous and
distinct realm, precise and technical in nature as opposed to indeterminate
and political. This conception places a serious constraint on the scope of
reforms aimed at pluralizing the institution and on the range of subjects who
can be imagined as potential participants in World Trade Organization ‘lawmaking’ practices. To the extent that they deal with technical legal issues,
only those groups from organized civil society that have developed the
expertise to engage with these issues can participate. This constraint is also
manifested in a growing divide between those civil society groups that have
chosen to pursue ‘inside’ versus ‘outside’ strategies in relation to the WTO.
I have argued that, much like the constitutionalists, civil society engagements
with the World Trade Organization have been oriented by the problematique
of legitimacy. Their efforts are similarly hamstrung by a persistent idea that
formal (positive) law is the source and guarantor of legitimacy. This is
reflected, for example, in the focus on the need for formal legal reforms to
improve the external transparency of the WTO, notwithstanding significant
developments at the informal level. More generally, to the extent that
advocacy successes at the informal level are not reflected in formal
institutional reforms and/or clearly defined legal norms, they are seen as
somehow lacking, inadequate or underdeveloped. It can also be seen in the
way that they frame their call for pluralism in terms of participation,
imagined as a separate matter from the actual legal frameworks that these
subjects are engaging with. In arguing that there is no great distance
between the ‘pluralist’ approach of civil society and the constitutional
approaches discussed earlier, I am suggesting that for each, a monist
conception of law itself functions as both an anchor and a limit to the reconceptualization of global trade governance. Both fail to recognize the
existent plurality of diverse and competing legal forms in the international,
and circumscribe further developments by locating them within the utopian
and perennially incomplete project of cosmopolitan law.

Global Trade Governance Unbound?
I have suggested that the apparent conflict between two approaches or styles
of thinking about law has defined the space within which the debates over
the future of the World Trade Organization as an institution are taking place.
The debates tend to oscillate between two positions that might be identified
as ‘constitutionalist’ and ‘pluralist’. This final section will attempt to step
back from the current debates to examine the question of the frame itself. Is
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it possible to re-imagine transnational governance in a way that is not
‘bounded’ by these two poles of constitutionalism and pluralism?62
The apparent conflict between these two approaches obscures the fact that, as
I’ve argued, they share a certain style or habit of thinking which foregrounds
questions of ‘legitimacy’ and links them to a particular way of conceiving
law.
These approaches also share, with the constitutional approach, a
tendency to think of law in terms of coherence, order, and totality. In this
final section of the paper, I consider whether it is possible to open up a space
for thinking about law in a different way. It should be clear by now that I am
not seeking to offer a pragmatic alternative to currently mooted proposals for
institutional reform. Instead, I am intentionally occupying a position that is
both provisional and provocative. My modest aim is to interrupt the
established parameters of current debates over WTO governance in order to
speculate about what implications a metaphoric shift in our capacity to
imagine legal forms might have in this context.63
Martti Koskeniemmi, a provocateur whose project has sympathies with my
own, developed a dichotomy similar to the one I have outlined above, in a
recent talk.64 Koskeniemmi identifies these two approaches, ‘constitutional’
and ‘legal pluralist’ as reflections of the modernist tendency to pit narratives
of unity and fragmentation against one another. In his account, unity or
constitutionalism is considered as a hegemonic project, impelled by a
totalizing logic of power, globalization, and empire; against which plurality
is frequently posited as the counter-hegemonic vehicle of freedom and
innovation. Koskeniemmi chooses to describe these contrasting approaches
to representing law in the transnational as ‘legal mindsets’ rather than as
legal theories, both to highlight their location within these wider narrative
streams and to reveal their subjectivity and fluidity. According to him, both
are responses to the problem of ‘fragmentation’ of international law and
neither is entirely successful in meeting the challenge of mediating between
the need for ‘centrality and control on the one hand, diversity and freedom
on the other”.65 They cannot be successful, in part, because he argues that as
‘generalizing doctrines’ the meaning of these approaches is not predetermined; it depends on context. As he puts it, “their political significance
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is ambivalent. Each may be used to support as well as to challenge the
existing state of affairs.”66 In Koskeniemmi’s account, as in mine, the
differences between constitutional and pluralist approaches are minimized.
What is of greater analytic significance for each of us is the connections
among these mindsets, rather than their clashes.
Where my argument differs from his is in what we make of this insight. He
argues by way of conclusion that the task for critical lawyers should be to
reveal the multiple and shifting politics of these competing regimes, and to
politicize the discourse of multiplicity itself.
“This is why I am not worried about the multiplicity of
regimes or the clash of legal rationales. On the contrary, they
are the platform for today’s politics. The real concern is the
homogeneity of the cultural and professional outlook of the
participants, the pretense that the decision follow cognitive or
technical grounds and are therefore immune to political
contestation . . . I want to suggest that the discourse of
multiplicity itself should be redescribed in political terms, as a
competition between different systems and criteria for
allocating resources between social groups.”67.
While I agree that it is important to understand the impact of competing
normative regimes for differently situated publics, I’m not sure that shifting
the analysis from the legal to the political register necessarily makes things
more transparent. Representing international legality in this way seems to
suggest that politics is something that is somehow ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the
law, rather than already embedded within legal discourses and institutions.
As Koskeniemmi well knows, while law and politics are interpenetrated,
legal discourses cannot be equated in any straightforward way with political
outcomes. Moreover, while a critical investigation of the politics of law in
particular contexts can be quite helpful in revealing law’s failures and
exclusions, it has little to say about the productive or generative aspects of
law, or about the capacities of legal subjects to contest or make new
meanings out of the law.
I believe a more generous reading of Koskeniemmi is available, however.
Of course he can be read as calling for more attentiveness to the particular
effects of different ways of talking about law – this is clear when he speaks
of the limitations of a technocratic, realist approach that draws heavily on
certain branches of International Relations theory and sees little of value in
the more aspirational discourses of public international law. But, he also
reminds us of Kant’s dictum that rules don’t determine their own application.
Rather, they must be interpreted and applied by legal subjects, operating
within particular discursive and institutional contexts. Indeed, one of his
signature contributions has been to draw greater attention to the work of
these subjects in the making of international law.68 So it would seem that his
conception of law must also include an important role for the law creating
function of legal subjects.
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This reading would bring Koskeniemmi much closer to my own provocation:
which rests in the attempt to imagine law as itself inherently plural, a quality
that I posit as emerging from an appreciation of the manifold potential of a
world of law-creating subjects. While an understanding of subjectivity as
law-making also underpins Koskeniemmi’s account, he is more concerned
with the relatively homogeneous professional category of international
lawyers, whom he fears are lacking both creativity and political commitment.
I am more interested in exploring what new pathways for thinking are
opened up when we think of a much wider range of subjects as potentially
law-creating in this way.69
My effort to re-imagine the ‘bounded’ discourses of global trade governance
in this way has been inspired by the ‘radical’ or ‘critical’ legal pluralism of
Rod McDonald, who has suggested that we need to think of law in terms of a
‘metaphor of multiplicity’.70 MacDonald’s legal pluralism is quite distinct
from the varieties of pluralism found in contemporary international legal
discourse discussed above and from mainstream theories of law. It departs
from the view that law is necessarily formal and can be exclusively identified
with state action. Neither does it rely on a dichotomous construction of law
and politics (or society).71 Where this account of law differs most
significantly from the conceptions that I have argued are embedded within
the discourses of trade governance, including those identified with ‘global
legal pluralism’, is in its resistance to the cosmopolitan urge to accommodate
difference within some overarching totality.
Without the need for recourse to a unifying image of the constitutional
moment, a radically legal pluralist imaginary could embrace multiplicity,
heterarchy, and diversity. It might allow for the possibility of thinking about
transnational legality without a ‘centre’, or normative hierarchy. That is, the
relationship between emergent transnational regulatory regimes need not be
reduced to a necessary relation of superior/inferior as judged by the extent to
which they are more or less ‘legal’ or ‘constitutional’. Rather, they could be
understood in a variety of ways: overlapping, discrete, competing,
interpenetrated, mutually constitutive. In this way, the public discussion
about the emergence and evolution of transnational legal norms might both
be opened up to include a much wider range of formal and informal,
institutional and discursive mechanisms, and to consider them on their own
terms, rather than in relation to where they sit on a spectrum of ‘legitimacy’
in which ‘formal’ law still occupies the highest rung;
“A radical legal pluralism seeks neither a separation, nor an
eventual reconciliation, of multiple legal orders. Normative
heterogeneity exists both between various normative regimes
which inhabit the same intellectual space, and within the
regimes themselves. The flux of power within and between
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these regimes is determinative of their reconstruction within
any given time-space. The condition of living through the
construction of normative regimes frustrates any attempt to
unify or order them. That is, a radical legal pluralism must be
polycentrist”72
Debates within the frame of what I am calling legal plurality can be
contrasted with dominant approaches in the ways they might envision the
participation of global civil society. An illustrative example of the latter is
found in the framework provided by de Burca and Walker, in their role as
editors of a collection of essays on the topic of “Law, Civil Society and
Transnational Economic Governance.”73 In their introduction, although they
acknowledge the multiple discourses of civil society in careful detail, law is
represented as a ‘central steering mechanism’: “One general and overarching
question concerns the possibilities and limits of the role of law, in its
institutional and discursive specificity, within the post national setting…does
law, as a central steering mechanism, inevitably organize civil society in
such a way as to reduce its autonomy?”74 The way the question is posed
here, I would argue, prefigures its answer. If law is conceived as both
centralized and autonomous, that is, an institutionalized realm of
‘coordination’ that is separate from politics, it is hard to imagine it as capable
of facilitating a multiple and diverse politics of global civil society. This is
because in mainstream approaches, the legal/political subject (here, civil
society) can only be constituted, or ‘called forth,’ by being ‘called into
line.’ 75
Far from being ‘autonomous’ actors that might be envisioned to redress
current ‘imbalances’ in global governance, I have argued that organized civil
society networks have emerged and taken shape in response to developments
in transnational governance. The discourse, methods, and objectives of both
civil society and governance networks must be understood as intersubjectively constituted. What is important to stress, however, is that this
insight has particular consequences for how one imagines the ‘form’ of law.
Law can no longer be imagined independently from these ongoing processes
of inter-subjective norm generation, but is itself generated by them.
I have suggested that concerns with the legitimacy of transnational
governance turns our attention towards questions of legal form, rather than
substance, so that its outcomes are necessarily framed in terms of processes
or procedures rather than rules. Through the lens of legal pluralism, in
contrast, the construction and contestation of normative frameworks by legal
subjects becomes the focus of the inquiry. For example, while much work
has been done to more fully integrate the reconsideration of questions of
recognition and participation into constitutional approaches to the WTO, the
risk of dealing with these issues in constitutional terms is that they will
become just another institutional design problem; another procedural detail
______________________________________________________________
72
73
74
75

MacDonald, supra n.28 at 21.

de Burca and Walker, “Law and Transnational Civil Society: Upsetting the
Agenda?” (2003) 9(4) EJL 387.
ibid., at 389.
Christodoulidis, “Constitutional Irresolution: Law and the Framing of Civil
Society” (2003) 9(4) EJL 401 at 426.

18

Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 57, No. 4]

to be worked out by the institutional engineers of the global legal order. In
my view, the answers to such questions cannot be pre-determined.
Institutional frameworks, the meaning of participation and the sources of
legitimacy can and likely will be a multiple, contestable, and evolving as the
subjects that are to be governed.
Imagining law as polycentrist, intersubjectively constituted and nonprescriptivist also facilitates a reflexive approach to the relationship between
law and politics in the international realm. Law is not a separate and distinct
realm of normative ordering. As Koskeniemmi reminds us, law provides a
fluid and evolving space and discourse within which competing normative
claims are debated, engaged, negotiated and compromised. Yet, law and
politics should not be imagined as discrete realms of activity, whether it is
law or politics that is placed in the driver’s seat. Rather, they need to be
understood as intimately tied together in a mutual relation of ‘constituent
complicity’. It then follows that instead of being fixed and determinate, the
form of law itself must also always be subject to re-conceptualization and
transformation. Allowing ourselves to re-conceive of transnational legal
institutions and the politics surrounding them in this way, I argue, could
further the dual aims of fostering political pluralism and increasing the
legitimacy of an institution such as the WTO.
For example, from within this perspective, we can consider how new
instantiations of transnational political practice, such as those exemplified by
various transnational movements for global social justice over the past
decade, might influence the form of transnational legal regimes, as well as
the converse. Global civil society exists and operates from within relatively
more ‘disorganized’ and ‘organized’ manifestations, yet a focus on its
relation to more ‘constitution-like’ legal forms such as the World Trade
Organization will tend to highlight the activities of the relatively more
organized nongovernmental organizations, and those activities in particular
that are specifically directed towards the ‘constitution’ of that institution.
Law need not only be imagined as the necessary ‘institutional’ container of
an unruly and disruptive ‘politics’ that is ‘prior’ to law but must be
authorized by it. The form of law itself might also be understood in its more
‘disorganized’ form, as potentially plural, disruptive, subject to reconceptualization and transformation.
There is indeed a crisis of legitimacy in global trade governance. The need
to democratize and pluralize transnational economic institutions such as the
WTO is pressing. The most significant barriers to reform, however, are not
in fact the formal, institutional obstacles that attract the bulk of attention.
Rather, they are the conceptual foundations of the debate itself, including
most importantly assumptions about the autonomous and ‘monist’ nature of
law, and the institutionalized relationship between the realms of law and
politics. Re-envisioning the form of law as itself plural and contested invites
us to transcend the limitations of the constitutional (and constitutive) form in
which we currently find ourselves compelled to imagine the relationship
between law and politics in the realm of trade governance. In this
conception, the parameters of law are determined by the potential of a
diverse array of lawmaking subjects; its only limitations the limits of our
ability to imagine alternative legal worlds. Unbounding our conception of
transnational governance in this way frees us to engage with a much broader
set of subjects and concerns than we might otherwise, and could provide a
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more productive avenue through which to approach the pressing issues of
inclusion, legitimacy and accountability.

